

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 022540

12

ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /011 R

66624

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:W. NEWLIN

APPROVED BY:S/S-O:W. NEWLIN

----- 045133

P 020346Z FEB 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO CINCLANT FOR POLAD

S E C R E T STATE 022540

EXDIS

FOL PARIS 32491 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ANKARA ATHENS BONN  
BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON LONDON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA  
REYKJAVIK ROME THE HAGUE NATO USNMR SHAPE EC BRUSSELS  
DECEMBER 20, 1973 REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T PARIS 32491

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, FR

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN DEFENSE

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: DESPITE A SENSE OF CONCERN IN PARIS REGARD-  
ING THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, WE BELIEVE THERE IS AN  
EXAGGERATED PERCEPTION IN SOME NATO CAPITALS OF GOF WILLINGNESS  
TO INCREASE ITS COOPERATION IN EUROPE'S DEFENSE. THE GOF IS  
POSING THE ISSUE THE FRENCH DESCRIBE AS "THE INCREASINGLY  
DISTINCT CHARACTER OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE." THEY ARE FOCUSING  
EUROPEAN ATTENTION ON THE PROSPECTIVE ROLES OF NATO, EUROGROUP,  
WEU, THE EC AND BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS IN EUROPEAN  
DEFENSE, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT PROVIDING ANSWERS TO THE ISSUE  
THEY POSE. THEY ARE NOT, HOWEVER, MOVING TOWARD NATO AS THE  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 022540

FOCUS OF THEIR ATTENTION. THE U.S. SHOULD BEGIN TO ADDRESS  
THE QUESTION OF HOW IT WILL RESPOND TO THE QUESTION POSED BY  
THE FRENCH, PARTICULARLY SINCE EUROPEANS' POSITION IS NOT RIGD  
AND WE CAN INFLUENCE DIRECTION OF THEIR THINKING. OUR  
DECISION WILL HAVE FUNDAMENTAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

VIABILITY OF NATO. END SUMMARY.

2. FRANCE'S APPROACH TO NATIONAL DEFENSE RESTS ON SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS: FIRST, THE SOVIETS POSE A REAL THREAT TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE. SECOND TO BE EFFECTIVE, DEFENSE MUST BE NATIONAL AND INDEPENDENT. ONLY THE NATION STATE CAN GALVANIZE THE LOYALTIES AND EFFORTS NEEDED TO BUILD A STRONG DEFENSE. THIRD, THE INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCE IS THE BASIC INGREDIENT OF SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE, WHICH IS THE GOAL OF FRANCE'S DEFENSE EFFORT. FOURTH, A PROLONGED CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT IN EUROPE MUST BE AVOIDED. TO THE GOF, THE DEVASTATION THAT WOULD FLOW FROM A RE-RUN OF WORLD WAR II COMBAT IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM THE RESULTS OF NUCLEAR WAR. FIFTH, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES, AND THEIR LINKAGE TO EUROPE BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SIZEABLE NUMBERS OF U.S. FORCES ON THE CONTINENT, ARE NECESSARY TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE. SIXTH, THE UNITED STATES IS AN INCREASINGLY UNRELIABLE PARTICIPANT IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, PARTLY BECAUSE OF NUCLEAR PARITY AND US-USSR BILATERALISM, PARTLY BECAUSE OF NEO-ISOLATIONISM, IN THE U.S. SEVENTH, WHILE GERMANY POSES NO PRESENT THREAT AGAINST FRANCE, POSSIBLE SHIFTS IN GERMANY'S POLICIES COULD CHANGE THIS. EIGHTH, FRENCH DEFENSE IS STRENGTHENED TO THE EXTENT THAT OTHER NATIONS DEPLOY LARGE MODERN FORCES BETWEEN FRANCE'S EASTERN BORDER AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. NINTH, AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND DEFENSE POLICIES, INDEPENDENT OF U.S. CONTROL (BUT ASSOCIATED WITH THE U.S. WHERE THAT APPEARS ADVANTAGEOUS TO EUROPE) ARE A GOAL OF EUROPEAN UNION. TENTH, FRANCE'S POLITICAL AIM OF USING THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION MOVEMENT AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING ITS OWN POWER, REGIONALLY AND GLOBALLY, IS REINFORCED BY FRANCE'S ASPIRATIONS TO PLAY A COMMANDING ROLE EVENTUALLY IN BUILDING A UNIQUELY EUROPEAN DEFENSE. FINALLY, FRENCH ARMS INDUSTRY MUST OBTAIN EXPORT MARKETS ADEQUATE TO INCREASE PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IN THIS SECTOR, KEY FRENCH VIEWS OF SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 022540

3. FROM THESE ASSUMPTIONS AND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF DANGEROUS TRANSITIONS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, FRG OSTPOLITIK AND WANING EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORTS -- ALL TIED TO WHAT THE FRENCH SEE AS AN UNDULY BENIGN VIEW OF DETENTE BY THE U.S. AND MOST OF EUROPE -- THE FRENCH FEAR THAT THE OLD DAYS OF THE US/NATO GUARANTEE OF FRENCH SECURITY ARE NUMBERED. WHILE WE DETECT NO SENSE OF IMMEDIACY IN FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT HOW TO REPLACE THIS DIMINISHING GUARANTEE, THE FRENCH ARE POSING THE QUESTION -- ALBEIT SOMETIMES OBSCURELY -- ABOUT EUROPE'S FUTURE SECURITY.

4. FRENCH PRONOUNCEMENTS ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE HAVE BEEN A STRANGE MIXTURE OF GENERAL STATEMENTS THAT EUROPE'S DEFENSE IS ASSUMING A SPECIAL CHARACTER (E.G., FONMIN JOBERT'S STATEMENTS

OVER PAST SIX MONTHS, FRENCH DRAFT NATO DECLARATION), COUPLED WITH ALMOST TOTAL SILENCE REGARDING WHAT ACTIONS SHOULD FLOW FROM THIS GENERAL PRINCIPLE. WHEN WE SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM SENIOR GOF OFFICIALS REGARDING EVOLVING FRENCH THINKING ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE, WE ARE TOLD THAT FRENCH EFFORTS ARE DESIGNED TO PROD MORE CONSERVATIVE EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO THINK ABOUT THEIR OWN DEFENSE. OUR SOURCE ALWAYS UNDERLINE, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE REMAINS COMMITTED TO ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, THAT U.S. NUCLEAR GUARANTEE AND PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE ARE CRUCIAL TO EUROPE'S DEFENSE AND THAT AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORT IS A LONG WAY IN FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, BY THEIR ACTIONS THE FRENCH SEEM DETERMINED TO FORCE THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO CONFRONT QUESTION OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

5. TO A EUROPEE HUNGRY FOR SOME SIGN THAT FRANCE IS PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD GREATER DEFENSE COOPERATION, THESE TANTALIZING HINTS BY THE FRENCH IN THAT DIRECTION HAVE BEEN WELCOME. JUDGING BY REPORTS FROM SEVERAL NATO CAPITALS, WE BELIEVE MANY EUROPEANS HAVE MISTAKEN FRENCH TACTICS -- I.E., POSING THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE -- FOR A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN FRENCH DEFENSE POLICY. UNDOUBTEDLY THERE IS A SHARPENED PERCEPTION IN PARIS THAT THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE IS ASSUMING AN "INCREASINGLY DISTINCE CHARACTER." STRIPPED OF ITS RHETORIC, THE FRENCH MEAN THAT EUROPE CAN NO LONGER COUNT INDEFINITELY ON THE MS, TO PUT INTEREST OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AHEAD OF ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN THIS FRENCH VIEW. IT WAS AT HEART OF GAULLIST POLICY FOR YEARS. WHAT IS NEW IS A SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 022540

WILLINGNESS BY FRENCH TO STIMULATE ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES TO THINK ABOUT AND DISCUSS IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE'S SECURITY INHERENT IN THIS MISTRUSTFUL VIEW OF U.S. INTENTIONS. WE EXPECT THAT FRENCH WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO SHIFT FOCUS OF "THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE" AWAY FROM NATO (BUT WITHOUT SEVERING EXISTING TIES WITH NATO, TOWARD OTHER FORA (BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH KEY POWERS, E.G., UK AND FRG, WEU; EC POLITICAL STRUCTURE).

6. AT THE SAME TIME THAT FRENCH ARE PUBLICIZING DISTINCT NATURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE, OUR OTHER ALLIES PERCEIVE IN U.S. ACTIONS OVER LAST MONTHS THE SUGGESTION THAT FRENCH VIEW IS NOT COMPLETELY WRONG. THIS HAS LED SOME OF THEM TO COVER THEIR NATO BETS BY SHOWING SOME RECEPTIVITY TO GOF EFFORTS, EITHER IN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHAT FRENCH REALLY MEAN, OR TO ENCOURAGE FRENCH IN WHAT ALLIES BELIEVE TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE EVOLUTION. THUS, THOUGH LEBER AND SCHEEL PUBLICLY REJECT A FRENCH HINT THAT "DISCUSSION AND REFLECTION" ON EUROPE'S DEFENSE MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN THE WEU, BRANDT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE, SIGNALING TO POMPIDOU IN THE COURSE OF FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT (PARIS 30955) THAT GERMANY DID NOT COMPLETELY RULE OUT IDEA OF WEU AS FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE DISCUSSION. SIMILARLY, ITALIANS SEEM PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN IDEA OF WEU AS FORUM TO ENTICE FRENCH INTO MEANINGFUL DEFENSE DISCUSSION (ROME 13429 (NO-

TAL). AS OUR ANALYSIS IN PARIS 32185 SUGGESTED, WE AGREE WITH EM-  
BOFF COMMENT IN PARA 2 OF ROME 13429 AND WITH FRG VIEW (BONN 17324  
NOTAL) THAT GOF IS UNDER PRESSURE TO RETHINK EUROGROUP ISSUE. IT  
IS PULLED BETWEEN ECONOMIC CONSIDERA  
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 27 JUL 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, MILITARY CAPABILITIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 02 FEB 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974STATE022540  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** NEWLIN  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** P740146-1541  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740268/abbrzcdf.tel  
**Line Count:** 165  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
**Review Date:** 27 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <27 MAR 2002 by martinml>; APPROVED <31 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** EUROPEAN DEFENSE  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MARR, US, FR  
**To:** CINCLANT FOR POLAD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005